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GOD AND THE GAPS
by
Ross McCullough
April 2013
M ost often the story is told like this: There is some feature of the world that science is at a loss toexplain. Christians rush to claim that this feature can only be explained by God. Science later
produces probable non-theistic hypotheses, and the Christians must beat a hasty retreat. In the early
nineteenth century, the feature was the complexity of life, the scienti c explanation Darwinian evolution.
Atheist pulses quicken at this story, but its lesson is just as received among theologians: We must not put
God in the gaps. We must keep our commitments clear of the contracting ignorance of scienti c
explanations. As Dietrich Bonhoe er said, we must  nd God in what we know and not in what we don’t
know. But why should we not  nd God in both?
The question is particularly acute because there are gaps into which the Christian cannot avoid inserting
God. Witness the gap between Good Friday and Easter. The God of Scripture acts in history. His
transcendence does not preclude—it rather enables—his acting in the world as an unmediated e cient
cause, and such action cannot but leave a permanent gap in scienti c reconstructions.
There is no natural explanation for the Resurrection: The explanation is that God did it. Here is a gap and a
God we all already believe in. The inevitable theological conclusion is that there can be nothing wrong with
a God of the gaps, so long as it is not a God made to  t the gaps.
Why, then, disallow God from acting in primordial history? If the Catholic Church sends doctors to
Lourdes to examine the veracity of reported healings, why should she not send scientists to the fossil  elds?
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AIf God remains active and interfering in these last days after the Resurrection, why should we not  nd him
in those  rst six days, however long exactly they took?
The emergence of life is not by itself an argument for God’s existence. But it is by that fact a possible arena
of God’s interfering action. Why not, then, admit him as a possible hypothesis?
Deferring for a moment the scienti c appropriateness of a God hypothesis, the theologians’ opposition
shifts here from the properly theological, that God somehow does not  t into the gaps, to the apologetic,
that it may be ill-advised to build one’s beliefs on such shifting grounds. This is the essence of much
Christian suspicion: God has been inserted into the gaps in our knowledge only to be squeezed out again as
our knowledge expands; put him in again, have him rendered super uous again, and belief will su er.
cknowledging the worry as apologetic does two things, however. First, it introduces
countervailing apologetic concerns. Allowing God to become a kind of vanishing explanation
may have cost Christianity, but so too has the methodological atheism that has replaced it. The cultural
dominance of science ensures that its methods color our broader view of the world, and its atheism is no
exception.
Much has been made of our age’s disenchanted view of things, and at least one form of that—the form that
makes it di cult for us to believe in demon possession and miraculous healings and all those other
immediate spiritual interventions in our lives—stems directly from our scientism. How much that in turn
contributes to a broader atheism, how much it makes di cult also a belief in God, is an open question—but
I count even the  rst di culty a loss.
Second, if the worry about God in the gaps is an apologetic one, then it is essentially a contextual concern.
And here it begins to lose traction as a worry for our times. In a world of the watchmaker God, where
appeal to some otherwise unexplainable scienti c fact is taken as the singular demonstration of God’s
existence, we might rightly worry about the instability of scienti c conclusions. But the watchmaker’s reign
was of relatively limited compass: For most Christians during all of Christian history, arguments from the
gaps only supplemented other reasons for believing in God.
TGap arguments, after all, generally do not even point to the Christian God. The tinkering they take as
evidence could equally as well be that of Athena on Olympus as Elohim beyond the world. By their very
nature, they stand in need of supplement by other arguments.
And this is borne out today. No one now grants to gap arguments such indispensability, even those who
think that some form of them is successful. Theism today is too chastened by the reception of Darwin to be
so careless, and there is no reason why it should forget this chastisement, even were it to  nd such
arguments a useful addition to its cause.
Part of what the Enlightenment absolutized was its worries, and part of our absolution from it is putting
them back in proper perspective: Gap arguments can be helpful without being taken as either necessary or
su cient for belief. At present, as in the past, such arguments can serve as breaches in the dam of atheism
without being meant to clear the river on their own, or then to baptize you in the stream.
here remains the question of whether hypothesizing a God is appropriate for science. Three
reasons against it are usually suggested.
The  rst is that explanations-by-God are surds, that they do not admit of further explanation and so by
their nature shut down inquiry. And this is in a certain sense true: Explanations that appeal to acts of free
will, especially acts of divine free will, quickly exit the realm of science. To say “Apollo did it” is to cut o 
further scienti c explanation, either because Apollo is governed by a di erent, supernatural set of laws, or
because Apollo’s free acts cannot be explained by laws of e cient causality at all but only by ends and
intentions and all the other machinery of  nal causality.
In that sense, divine-agent explanations do bottom out for the scientist, but that is not quite the same thing
as saying that they shut down scienti c inquiry. To invoke Apollo is to give an explanation that does not
admit of further explanation, but it does not forestall alternate explanations. The sun can be said to rise
because Apollo mounts his chariot, and there may be no getting behind his decision to some further cause
of the morning; still, we can inquire whether there actually is a chariot, or a decision, or an Apollo.
We can still inquire whether other explanations, implying an Apollo or not, make better sense of the data.
The question is still open, in that sense; scienti c inquiry is still possible. To posit a God in the gaps simply
disallows an in nite chain of explanation.
The second reason given against God hypotheses is that they are too explanatory, that they can, in theory,
explain anything. Any gap can be  lled by God, so what makes this particular gap particularly indicative of
divine intervention? There need to be criteria for when inferences to divine activity are reasonable. This of
course is true, and the nature of such criteria is not obvious, depending as it does upon the phenomenon in
question.
Still, some such criteria exist. Even the atheist can acknowledge that at some point the hypotheses needed
to avoid God might become so improbable as to be unbelievable. If there were no fossil record of evolution,
and snakes and birds and human beings had all just appeared suddenly in the past, the case for a divine
designer would be a rather strong one.
The atheists who fete evolution do by their feting acknowledge this: It is just because the world is so and
not otherwise that they claim belief in God is irrational. But it is not clear that the world is so in all its
particulars, as for instance with the origin of life. It is not clear that the same sort of miraculously sudden
complexity that would characterize the spontaneous appearance of snakes in the fossil record does not
occur at a smaller level in the emergence of life.
This, again, is not an argument that it does. It is an argument that it could, and that we need to investigate
the gaps before we can give an answer either way. It is possible , under certain circumstances, that divine
activity stands as the best explanation. Allowing that, we can then inquire whether those circumstances are
our own.
And this brings in the third reason against admitting God as a hypothesis: We want it too much. We are
biased to  nd intelligence and design where there is none—recall the historical narrative of gods getting
squeezed progressively out of the gaps—and that should make us reluctant to do so again. But even
granting the worry, it stands only as a warning, not a prohibition.
The bogus Martian canals of the late nineteenth century, later demonstrated to be an optical illusion, are a
cautionary tale, but they would not prevent us from inferring the existence of Martians if a rover sent back
Timages of cave paintings. So also with divine design: Caution might reasonably be incorporated into our
criteria for inferring intelligence; it does not obviate the need for criteria altogether.
his is enough to undercut the methodological atheism taken for granted among the accepted and
aspiring sciences today. If the causal chain for a particular event might include God, our
reconstructions of the chain in scienti c explanation should not in principle exclude him. For there is at
stake here not just apologetics, whether Christian or atheist, but what is always and most fundamentally at
stake in scienti c questions: the truth.
If a divine explanation is possibly the true explanation, why would we not entertain it? Perhaps we are
con dent that it will not turn out that way, but then why prejudge the matter? Why exclude a class of
possible answers? Why be atheistic as a matter of method? Why not, instead, choose a more catholic
science, admitting a broader array of hypotheses, excluding conclusions based not on predetermined
criteria but on what best  ts the data?
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